SADC and the ever-changing faces of Authoritarianism in Africa

By Rawlings Magede

Modern day SADC continues to face unpredictable threats owing to the ever-changing landscape within Africa’s fragile democracy. When  the Southern African Development Coordination Conference  (SADCC as it was called then),  was created in 1980 in Lusaka, it had one clear objective; to support the anti-apartheid struggle and the liberation of countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia .Once this objective was achieved, first with the Lancaster House Agreements, which brought about the end of Southern Rhodesia and the birth of a new Zimbabwe, led by Robert Mugabe, and then with the end of apartheid (1994) in South Africa, the organisation began a difficult journey of redefining its identity and programme which even today does not seem to have been achieved.

At the time its transformed from SADCC to SADC (Southern African Development Community) in 1992, the new organisation faced a myriad of security challenges among member states. One real test was in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998 when Laurent Kabila defeated Mobutu Seseseko in 1997.Following this victory, Kabila’s relations with neighbouring countries such as Rwanda and Uganda deteriorated. In July 1998, Kabila ordered all officials and troops from Rwanda and Uganda to leave the country.  Instead on August 2, 1998, those troops began supporting rebels who were intent on overthrowing Kabila. At the time, SADC had launched the SADC Organ of Politics, Defence and Security on 28 June 1996. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe had been elected the Chairman of the Organ. The organ wasted no time in restoring peace again in DRC during the 1998 civil war by deploying troops and also helped in returning democracy and rule of law in Mauritius after there was a coup in the country. These two examples stand out as key instances where SADC flexed muscle and restored peace during armed conflicts. Since then, SADC strategy has been that of quiet diplomacy that proffers piecemeal and unsustainable solutions as has been the case in several SADC countries including Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

The problem with SADC

One challenge facing SADC relates to what many scholars have termed the “Brotherhood syndrome” where liberation movements such as the ANC in South Africa, ZANU PF in Zimbabwe, Frelimo in Mozambique, SWAPO in Namibia and the MPLA in Angola tend to shield one another from interference or criticism. This approach has reversed previous gains made by SADC in the past such as strengthening rule of law and democracy. For example, after the conclusion of the harmonised 2023 elections in Zimbabwe, following release of an Electoral Observer Mission report by SADC, the regional body was exposed for its lack of decisiveness and double standards. The report among other issues noted that the electoral body, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) failed to provide a voters’ role for inspection ahead of the election, no consultations were done to make the process of procurement and designing of ballot papers more transparent to instil public confidence, failure to implement requisite legal reforms and laws regulating postal voting to introduce means of monitoring and observation of the process to guarantee the secrecy of the ballot. The report concluded by noting that nomination fees were prohibitive. The report divided opinion within SADC as more leaders avoided debates around the elections in Zimbabwe. The Head of the SADC Observation Mission, Nevers Mumba received back clash by trolls and some senior Zanu pf leaders after the first preliminary report was released.

 Although SADC released a statement condemning the attack on Mumba, the message had already been delivered and helped strengthen more the debate that SADC when confronted with real threats falters. The question that continues to linger and divide opinion with SADC countries relates to the capacity of SADC to improve electoral democracy among its members. The regional organisation has in the past observed elections that have produced disputed outcomes such as those in DRC, Zimbabwe, Malawi among other countries. SADC Observer Missions have made recommendations in all these countries but to date, very little has been done by member states to improve electoral democracy. Key Provisions on SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections have been violated by member states and no penalties or sanctions have been effected.

In the absence of punitive measures against member states violating SADC conventions and statues, key questions have emerged. Why are member states reluctant to act upon recommendations from SADC? Is it because member states do not take the regional body serious? Another challenge relates to the structure of election observation missions, which are often made up of government officials with little civil society participation. This alone continues to undermine the credibility of these missions. This is often the only time citizens actually see SADC at work in their own countries – when vehicles with the SADC logo and officials with flap jackets do the rounds at election time. Incidents such as those in the previous Malawi elections and the many controversial statements by SADC on elections in Zimbabwe have not ingratiated SADC with the people of those countries, or the opposition. Finally, the fact that many resolutions that are adopted are not implemented also undermines people’s faith in SADC.

SADC and the lack of citizen representation

The continent is going through a wave of military coups that have become generally accepted by citizens across the continent. West Africa particularly Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Guinea have all experienced incessant military coups in recent years. The regional body, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been found wanting as it failed to restore democratic transitions in these countries. More recently, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso announced that they had quit ECOWAS and justified their decision by highlighting that it was their “sovereign decision” to do so. This has left the regional body weaker given that citizens in these countries have embraced military coups as a panacea to dictatorship.

Regional bodies such as SADC and ECOWAS often struggle with the issues to do with sovereignity and non-interference. The fear of losing sovereignty stems from the political weakness of states and from the lack of common values, mutual trust and a shared vision. In the case of a country voluntarily, withdrawing membership, these bodies do not have mechanisms to deal with such eventualities. The absence of common values creates divisions among member states who subscribe either to democratic or authoritarian orientations. Absence of common values has prevented these organisations from addressing violence and insecurity generated by authoritarianism and repression in some member countries.

More importantly, SADC does not have proper institutions that properly represent citizens. Platforms such as the SADC Non-State Actors (NSA) have been criticized for being too elite and excluding critical voices especially from civil society. For example, citizens in SADC cannot turn to a tribunal when they feel violated by their own governments. The SADC tribunal was dissolved in 2012 following pressure from former Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe. In other jurisdictions such as West Africa, citizens can turn to the ECOWAS court of Justice. Having such a mechanism offers a chance to build citizen trust in institutions and help keep excesses of governments in check.

In the final analysis, it is important to underscore the need for a reflection on the effectiveness of SADC in the face of violent conflict. The conflict in Mozambique (Cabo Delgado) exposed a gap within the regional organisation. It should be recalled that shortly before the arrival of the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM),the active regional peace keeping mission in Cabo Delgado Province, the Rwandan army arrived in earlier which caused another diplomatic incident between Mozambique and SADC.In their defence, the Mozambican authorities reiterated that it was its right to choose its partners freely, and again it helped expose a clear lack of a common spirit on “Sadcness”.Going forwad,it will be key to reflect on the preparedness of SADC  in the event that the wave of coups that has hit West Africa spreads to Southern Africa. Does SADC have the necessary mechanism to respond? Does SADC still have the will power to respond swiftly to civil wars as was the case in the DRC during the late 1990s? All these questions highlight the need for serious reform and restructuring of SADC.There is need to reform the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security to match possible eventualities.

Rawlings Magede is an International Development expert with over 10 years’ experience.

 

 

 

The African Union and the new threat of Terrorism

By Rawlings Magede

When the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed some 60 years ago, one of the key founding principles was on the right of the African people to control their own destiny. This was against a background where several African countries were still under the shackles of colonialism. Years later, through its vibrant leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, independence became a reality in Africa.

In 2002 when the OAU transited to become the African Union (AU) its focus slightly shifted to encourage political and economic integration among member states and to eradicate colonialism and neo-colonialism from the African continent. Although this seemed noble, questions on how it was going to be achieved continued to occupy public discourse. This was so because even after independence several African countries continued to institute disastrous Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and kept them in perpetual debt thereby creating a dependency syndrome on foreign capital. Countries like Zambia and Ghana among other countries implemented such programmes in the 1980s while Zimbabwe did so in the 1990s.

The present Day AU faces a myriad of problems.

Economic emancipation and the need to cut loose the dependency syndrome has remained one of the challenges facing the AU. Added to this, an even bigger challenge of terrorism continues to derail peace and security in Africa. This has been fueled by various rebel groups that have set bases on the continent. This continues to expose the fragility of the continent’s peace and security mechanisms. During the 50^th Anniversary of The African Union in May 2013, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted a landmark declaration. This declaration spelt out how Africa would not bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation and made a commitment to end violent conflicts on the continent by 2020.This was then translated into the AU initiative: Silencing the Guns by 2020.This was followed up by the United Nations (UN) and AU Joint framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security in  2017 an the Joint Framework for Implementation of Africa’s Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda  for Sustainable Development in 2028.This arrangement has seen the UN and AU collaborating closely, more regular exchange of information and consultations, coordinated action including joint field visits and joint statements.

Since then, the continent has experienced even more violent conflicts and civil wars. In 2021 alone, twelve African countries-Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia saw external involvement in their domestic conflicts. Multiple state-based conflicts in Africa are because of the rise and expansion of the Islamic State (IS). In the same year nine countries in Africa; Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, DRC, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia experienced conflicts with IS within their territories. More recently, DRC based rebel group, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) killed and abducted several students at Kasese District-based Lhubirira Secondary school in Western Uganda. The attack left 41 people dead while several were abducted. This month in Kenya, eight police officers were killed in a suspected attack by Somalia-based rebel group al-Shabab in Garissa County (Eastern Kenya).

The AU Peace and Security Council and its challenges

All these incidences have gravely exposed the inability of the AU to decisively deal with the ever-increasing threat of terrorism on the continent. The Peace and Security Council is saddled by a myriad of challenges ranging from poor funding to the lack of cooperation of member states to deploy forces. The financing challenges facing the AU have important unintended consequences. High levels of donor dependency have weakened ownership in the fight against the new threat of terrorism.

Against such a threat, there is need for the 55 AU member states to design a sustainable funding model that might mean that member states must make annual financial pledges that can be broken down into installments. In the past, this has proved problematic as several countries have reneged on their pledges.

More importantly is the need for AU member states to do anything necessary to address the threats posed by terror. For example, the DRC has become a haven for rebel groups such as the M23, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). These rebel groups have initiated and coordinated attacks from the DRC and easily evade detection due to the issue of porous borders within East Africa. In the long term, the rebel groups might set up bases elsewhere and spread across the continent. This will present an even bigger security problem for the AU.

Current funding arrangements for the AU to deal decisively with the threat of terrorism are neither reliable nor predictable, especially in the wake of an increase in terror attacks. The new challenge facing the continent now more than ever is terrorism which has continued to fuel civil wars and coordinated attacks. To win this war over terrorism requires all hands-on deck by every African country in terms of cooperation to deploy troops and resources.

In the final analysis, financing peace and security in Africa on a sustainable basis is not only an African priority but a global strategic imperative, given the complex and interconnected nature of threats to international peace and security today.

Nyumbani or Kifo!

Rawlings Magede is an International Development Specialist and Rotary International Peace Fellow. He writes here in his personal capacity. Feedback on rawlingsmagede2@gmail.com

Peace Education as a tool for Post-Conflict Healing in Rwanda

By Rawlings Magede

My visit to one of the Genocide memorials

During the past weeks I was holed up in Rwanda visiting memorial sites and villages in a quest to learn more on how the country has recovered years after the 1994 genocide that left more than 800,000 civilians dead. The genocide lasted for hundred days and engulfed the country into a turmoil as organised killings and massacres of the Tutsi escalated.

The colonial practice of ethnic profiling on identity documents aided in the easy identification of Tutsi minorities during roadblocks and targeted searches. Churches that had since time immemorial been credited for speaking truth to power become complicit in the killings and often deceitfully offered “safe” refuge to Tutsis but only alerted the Interahamwe’s (   Hutu militias) who massacred hundreds of thousands in cold blood. The snail’s pace by the international community to intervene and stop the killings further aided the killers and saw the killings stretching up to hundred days. In my Rwandan learning experience, I sought to understand how the country with several genocide memorial sites that are open to outside visitors had managed to overcome this dark past. Most complex is the youth bulge within the Rwandan population. Rwanda has a population of 13.25 million. According to statistics by the United Nations, at the end of the genocide  an estimated 95, 000 children are believed to have been orphaned, were products of rape and were born with some ailment given that in some cases rape by HIV infected Hutus was a weapon of war. How then has Rwanda managed to target young people in its quest for post conflict, healing, and reconciliation?

Anti-genocide laws

Article 16 of the Rwandan constitution provides for Non-discrimination and makes such an act a punishable offence. This important clause is a product of post genocide reconstruction    by the government in trying to heal festering wounds of the 1994 genocide that was instituted based on tribe and ethnicity. Modern Rwanda has managed to transform itself from ethnic identification and this has seen the country discarding ethnic profiling on key documents such as identity documents. Even the people prefer not to be identified by the ethnic origins but rather choosing to be identified as Rwandese. This in my view remains a positive step in reducing future ethnic hostilies. However, this is not without its challenges. For example, it might pose a serious threat to the annihilation of one’s ethnic origins or identity.

Peace Education in schools.

Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), Aegis Trust developed a model for peace education in Rwanda, supporting tens of thousands of young people across the country with the knowledge and skills to overcome the legacy of genocide. Peace education started as a pilot project at Kigali Genocide Memorial in 2008.In 2014, the Rwanda Education Board announced inclusion of peace and values education as a cross-cutting subject in Rwanda’s new national curriculum.

In the events leading to the 100 days of genocide, Rwanda suffered from the lack of education and other infrastructure for peace. Youth were over-equipped with killing instruments – traditional arms, machetes, guns, etc.  Violent meetings were organized around the country. The media broadcasted violent messages, and hatred was spread around the country. There were warning signs about a possible genocide, and youth were indoctrinated in divisive and genocidal ideology.  Unrest, disorder, prejudice, despair, and instability were the common characteristics in Rwandese communities.

In the aftermath of the bloodshed, the slogan “Never Again” was coined with an objective to never allow the country to slide back into another genocide. In my observation, the country has made steady progress towards healing and reconciliation. Rwandans have demonstrated the power of human resilience. Firm recovery efforts have been made to rebuild the country. Anti-genocide and pro-peace strategies have been established and adopted by the people. While the country still has a lot of ground to cover to attain wholesome healing and reconciliation, the progress made thus far is quite encouraging. The introduction of peace education is a master stroke into the future that will ensure that coming generations understand the importance of peaceful coexistence anchored on ubuntu and human rights respect.

Lessons for Africa

African countries have gone through violent conflicts. While some governments have embraced the past and initiated healing and reconciliation infrastructure such as Truth and Peace Commissions, most of it has been piecemeal and has continued to be subject of rigorous debates among peace practitioners. In East Africa for example, countries such as Uganda continue to trudge on this path. Northern Uganda remains a region in dire need of healing and reconciliation following the war by rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) that left thousands of dead, homeless and divided. Efforts by the Ugandan government to issue a blanket amnesty on all LRA returnees has been met with mixed feelings as some returnees still face stigma, exclusion, and labelling within their communities. If not well managed, the country will once again slide back into armed conflicts. In countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that have known no meaningful peace since the 1950s due armed  conflicts by various rebel groups, little has been done to initiate a robust healing process for  communities that have been victims to successive rebels particularly in the Goma area. In Southern Africa, Zimbabwe to be specific, communities that have been on the receiving end of state sponsored massacres such as Gukurahundi are yet to fully enjoy the full benefits of any healing reconciliation process. Tribalism and exclusion continue to divide communities already divided by past atrocities such Gukurahundi and post 2000 cycles of election violence.

In the final analysis, Africa must confront its past and legacies of sponsored violence. This entails creating the requisite political will and strengthening institutions and commissions charged with the mandate of building real and genuine peace. Further bickering and interference will only derail any genuine healing and reconciliation processes.

Rawlings Magede is a Rotary Peace Fellow Based at Makerere University, Uganda. He writes here in his personal capacity. Feedback on rawlingsmagede2@gmail.com

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The ICC and the legacy of the LRA Abductions in Uganda

 By Rawlings Magede

With a former LRA Commander

Over the past weeks, I had  a series of engagements  with representatives from the International Criminal Court (ICC) and former commanders and returnees of Uganda’s notorious rebel group, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).The rebel group remains active today and its led   by Joseph Kony.The engagements touched on a number of issues ranging from the conviction of former LRA commander, Dominic Ongwen by the ICC,the issue of reparations for victims of Ongwen and then the integration process of former LRA returnees into communities in Northern Uganda.

The ICC and LRA

On 16 December 2003, the Ugandan government referred the war crimes by the LRA to the prosecutor of the ICC.Since 1986, the LRA led by its leader, Joseph Kony had wrecked havoc on the Acholi people of Northern Uganda. The move by the Uganda government  was the first time that a state party had invoked Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute in order to vest the Court with jurisdiction. These two articles  provide for the Exercise of jurisdiction and Referral of a situation by a state party respectively. The ICC set up an office in Uganda subsequently following this development. In 2005,the ICC issued a warrant of arrest for Kony  and his charges ranged from crimes against humanity,murder,enslavement,cruel treatment of civilians among others. Since then, several warrants of arrest have been issued against LRA commanders such as Vincent Otti.In 2021, the ICC successfully convicted Dominic Ongwen of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, torture, and enslavement and sentenced him to 25 years. Following the conviction, the ICC   plans to roll out a reparations program for victims who suffered at the hands of Ongwen. This has been received with mixed reactions by a cross section of victims of LRA in Northern Uganda. Some of the arguments by survivors is why the ICC reparations program is only targeting victims from the area where Ongwen operated. This has created critical conversations about reparations and the work of the ICC in Uganda. This move, if successful will likely create tensions and conflicts in Northern Uganda, an area that is also beset by a myriad of challenges.

The Ugandan Amnesty Act

In the year 2000, the Ugandan government enacted an Amnesty act as a tool to end rebellions in Uganda by encouraging LRA rebels to lay down their arms without the fear of prosecution for crimes committed during the fight against the government. Amnesties offer communities saddled with intractable conflicts to inevitably seek ways of breaking out of painful cycles of violence. The promise of amnesty and reintergration played a vital role in motivating fighters to escape or defect from the LRA.Following this enactment, several LRA Commanders, child soldiers and children born in captivity took heed of the call and fled LRA camps and fled  back to Northern Uganda.While this was a positive move to weaken the rebel group,a lot of challenges ranging from stigmatization,exclusion and poverty awaited the returnees.

In my engagements with a former LRA Commander, Charles Otim there are a wide range of concerns. Key among these is the lack of integration and inclusion of former LRA commanders in the army of Uganda. If anything, the controversial withdrawal of the 2000 Amnesty by government in 2012 has created serious suspicions among the returnees as they fear future prosecution. His other argument is that most alleged perpetrators within the rank and file of the LRA are victims themselves. In his case, he was abducted by LRA rebels when he was only 12 years old on his way to school and became a child soldier. Many young soldiers who were abducted during forceful conscriptions were subjected to other serious abuses. Otim argued that while the integration LRA senior commanders has posed a complex challenge, Ugandan communities particularly from the North continue to flag this issue with courage. While the offer for amnesty for LRA returnees was a minimum form of reparation from the government, it is issues of exclusion that have continued to fuel disgruntlement among returnees.

For example, another survivor that I met, MS Evelyn Amony highlighted that just like Mr. Otim, she was also a victim who was abducted by the LRA when she was only four years old. She spent more than eleven years held up in a LRA camp and gave birth to three children. She highlighted that since her return, she and her fellow returnees have suffered serious discrimination. Access to documents, especially by returnees, has also been a challenge and attempts to have these issues addressed have been met with stiff resistance even by the authorities. In 2014, through her organisation composed of women returnees, Women’s Advocacy Network (WAN) she petitioned the Ugandan parliament to take swift action and improve the welfare and challenges faced by LRA returnees. To date, there has been no response on the matter from the Ugandan Parliament. More worrying is the failure by government to roll out a robust rehabilitation program for most survivors. According to a 2018 study conducted by the Firoz Lalji Centre for Africa Research titled, “Politics of Return” which explores the return and reintegration of ex-rebels, notes   that poverty and denied access to land for returnees have hampered their reintegration and recovery. The study was conducted in the districts of Gulu, Nwoya and Amuru (Northern Uganda) targeting children born during the LRA war to identify gaps that exist in their birth registration. The findings also revealed that most children born in LRA captivity were born in DR Congo, The Central African Republic, and South Sudan. Getting these children key documents such as birth certificates and identity card documents has proved to be a mammoth task. This, coupled with lack of access to land and exclusion has compounded the modern-day challenges for the returnees.

In the final analysis, while debates on the exclusion of returnees will continue to run, legitimate as it is, such debates should not be allowed to paralyze the need for swift decision making and sound responses to the plight of LRA returnees. For there is, in fact considerable common ground across the population in Uganda that the majority of LRA returnees were first victims before they were forced to become perpetrators. To successfully address and recover from the legacy of the LRA conflict, Uganda needs to retain an official response on the plight of returnees, going beyond the use of force and prosecutions. The ICC needs to revise its reparation program in Northern Uganda and initiate a process that will target all victims of the LRA atrocities. Such a step acknowledges complexity and seeks to meet the needs of victims of all shades. In the words of Ms Evelyn Amony, “peace doesn’t have a language or ethnicity. Everyone has a responsibility to build peace”.

Rawlings Magede is Rotary Peace fellow based in Uganda, Kampala. He is also a Development Practioner.Feedback on rawlingsmagede2@gmail.com

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Vaccine Commodification and Ramifications for Countries in the Global South

By Rawlings Magede

The Covid-19 pandemic has exposed inequalities between countries in the Global North and those in Global South. While governments across the world have responded differently to contain the spread of the virus, vaccine hoarding and use of patent laws has crippled vaccine access and distribution in the Global South. Patent laws such as Intellectual Laws by pharmaceutical companies in the Global North makes it difficult for countries in the Global South to manufacture and distribute vaccines to their populations. The ring fencing of vaccine patents has created monopolies driven by profit and capitalism. The Covax scheme that was designed to bypass this has been plagued by inequity, funding shortfalls and a severe supply crunch. Its initial targets for the year 2021 were missed, partly as a result of the poor health infrastructure in many of the recipient country and partly because of vaccine hesitancy. Cultural and religious beliefs in most countries in the Global South have dealt a heavy blow to the attainment of herd immunity. Waiving of patents across the globe will culminate into better access of vaccines by countries in the Global South.

https://www.africaopl.org/publications/vaccine-commodification-and-ramifications-for-countries-in-the-global-south

The dilemma facing the Second Republic

By Rawlings Magede

President Emmerson Mnangagwa administration faces a huge dilemma going forwad. Distortions within the USD-RTGs rate have led to a spike in prices of basic commodities. The cost of living has seriously deteriorated in the first half of the year which has seen sharp increases in the price of fuel. Prices of basic goods have soared and the cost of living is not even comparable to the cost of labour. This rise has resultantly diminished disposable incomes for workers and the general populace who have already been dealt a heavy blow of unemployment. This has seen a serious decline in the standard of living and tremendously high levels of poverty.

The much touted rhetoric of a middle class economy that is anchored on National Development Strategy (NDS) 1 remains a farce.Overal funding for this ambitious strategy requires over US40 billion which the government does not have. Illicit financial flows, leakages and corruption have eroded government revenue that usually comes through tax. Underground economies particularly within the extractive industry which has   gained notoriety for tax evasions and smuggling of precious minerals such as gold continue to thrive. In 2021, corruption watchdog, Transparency International noted that Zimbabwe loses about 1 billion US dollars in revenue every year mostly because of political elites who engage in corruption. The report also indicated that the resulting institutionalization and systematization of corruption in Zimbabwean political and economic spheres has been extensive.

Most analysis of endemic corruption in Zimbabwe tends to focus on figures of financial resources lost through corruption but fail to give accurate statistics of the number of people who have been plunged into poverty through corruption. In understanding the dilemma facing the President Mnangagwa, we must do a run down from the 2017 coup and highlight what went wrong.

 

A neo-liberal agenda that failed to live to up to its billing

When President Mnangagwa took oath of office after the infamous 2017 military coup, his message was punctuated with hope and optimism. His message “Zimbabwe is open for business” soon became his clarion call to rally investors and international capital. So charmed were the Breton Woods institutions that in April 2019, a team from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced an agreement with the Zimbabwean government on macroeconomic policies and structural reforms that underpinned a Staff Monitored program (SMP).This monitoring programme would see the government and the IMF agreeing on policies to address the macroeconomic imbalances and tackle policy inconsistencies within government. This was then followed by removal of subsidies on fuel and other import subsidies. Even when citizens took to the citizens in January 2019 to register displeasure at the increase in the price of fuel, the president never took heed.

The IMF in 2020 also followed suit in registering displeasure in the administration of its SMP by government. It announced that the SMP program was “off track”. “Uneven implementation of reforms, notably delays and mis-steps in implementation and monetary reforms, have failed to restore confidence in the new currency,” the IMF said in a statement. The implementation of the SMP was beset by problems even before it even kicked off. While the government was keen to remove subsidies, over tax its citizens and partially privatize state institutions, it failed to demonstrate the willingness to arrest government’s insatiable appetite to spend. Throughout the SMP, spending especially by the Office of the President and Cabinet remained secretive. Added to this, in September 2019, the IMF even warned government that the state payouts to a partner of Trafigura group LTD undermined the country’s newly introduced currency. Payments to Sakunda Holdings in July 2019 owned by President Mnangagwa, Kuda Tagwirei under the command agriculture scheme were again secretive with most economists arguing that the payment made by the central bank were made after printing of more money. Such a disbursement led to an 80% surge in the amount of money in circulation compared with an IMF set target of between 8-10%.

Inconsistent policies

NDS1 presupposes that the US$40 billion needed for this ambitious programme will be sourced through traditional sources of finance, private sector and multilateral and bilateral creditors. One of the challenges of such an assumption is that no sane institution is willing to lend the government money because it is a bad debtor that still owes external creditors. In 2022, IMF resident representative to Zimbabwe, Patrick Imam remarked that public debt is an issue that has contributed significantly to the economic crisis facing the country. Three key drivers of Zimbabwe’s debt crisis are penalties on overdue external debt, budget deficit and the continued depreciation of the local currency. In June 2019 external debt stood at US$8.1 billion .Out of this chunk ,about US$5 billion is accumulated arrears, interest arrears and penalties, which constitute about 72.8% of external debt. Given this analysis, it means that the principal debt is around US$2.2 billion. In the face of distortions within the exchange rate, it becomes a mammoth task to service the external debt. Since government is a bad debtor, which institution (private capital included) is willing to lend money to bankroll NDS1?

One of the greatest undoing of President Mnangagwa’s administration has been policy inconsistencies. In May 2022 via a late-night broadcast, President Mnangagwa announced that banks would not be allowed to lend money to the government and the public sector. This announcement shook the market as a lot of companies suspended credit sales. Immediately, Tongaat Hulet, Zimbabwe’s largest sugar manufacturer announced that it was no longer making advance payments to farmers. In all these knee jerk reactions, the President is not firefighting alone. Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube and Reserve Bank Governor, John Mangudya have also been complicit in the collapse of the economy. Basic economics dictates that you cannot direct banks to stop lending when the rate between the US dollar and RTGs is growing.

One would expect the administration to change tact and approach in dealing with the ailing economy. The high levels of corruption, illicit financial flows, smuggling and leakages have continued unabated. Those close to the ruling establishment remain untouchable in their arcane dealings. Those responsible for managing government’s public relations and image have become a big joke as the signs of failure are glaring. Social services such as education and health care have become a preserve for a few in  a country with an NDS1 that highlight that government is supposed to have invested at least US$723 966 864 million into healthcare and wellbeing by 2022!What a big joke!

Against such a mess, the President recently encouraged young people to “make money” and take charge of their destinies. Intellectual and professional pursuit of honest work have been shunned in favour of “hustling” which in practice for many means self-enrichment through  being “runner boys or fronts” for the ruling elites. The gospel of becoming a real middle income country or agenda 2030 that is being parroted everyday is the biggest joke of the century.

In the final analysis, the Second Republic has failed to inspire confidence in citizens. Those assigned to do public relations and re-inspire citizens have dismally failed and continue to embarrass themselves on various platforms. As the country prepares for the 2023 plebiscite, the days ahead will have more eyes.

Homeland or Death! Tinofa Tichienda!

Rawlings Magede is a Development Practitioner who writes here in his personal capacity. Feedback on  rawlingsmagede2@gmail.com

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Beyond ZEC, the country needs a credible Electoral Body

 By Rawlings Magede

The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) turns 9 years this year having been established under Chapter 12 of the constitution in 2013. Its establishment was part of efforts by citizens to bring sanity to our electoral democracy especially after sham elections in 2002, 2005, and 2008 respectively. Since its establishment, the electoral body has done very little to inspire public confidence through its intents. After the 2013 elections that were generally peaceful, there were allegations that the electoral body had enlisted the services of an Israeli company, Nikuv to rig elections on its behalf. Though these allegations divided public opinion, they served to erode the little confidence citizens had in the new electoral body. As ZEC turns 9 years this year, has it fulfilled the aspirations of those that voted resoundingly in favour of the constitution in March 2013?

Our Electoral processes have always failed the test!

While the 2013 election was generally peaceful, reports of massive vote-rigging hampered the prospects of ZEC in presiding over free and fair elections. According to reports a complex confluence of factors accounted for the 2013 electoral outcome. In some cases, critics noted that the voters roll had ghost voters who ended up “voting” on Election Day. The term “ghost voters” became center stage after election results were released. In some constituencies, there were errors by the Commission which dealt a heavy blow to its credibility. Unlike the 2008 elections which were very violent, the 2013 elections exposed administrative gaps within the commission.

The 2018 elections, which were punctuated by a new President in Zanu Pf didn’t fare any better. Delays in the release of results exposed the commission's inability to be impartial. In constituencies such as Chegutu, the commission failed to vote-tallying of results and announced a losing candidate, Dexter Nduna as a winner. To this day, he represents this constituency in defiance of the principles of representative democracy. Former Zanu pf member, Jonathan Moyo has written a book dubbed “ExcellGate” that exposes how ZEC manipulated results using excel sheets. While allegations in this book must be taken with a pinch of salt, its contents must be seriously analyzed. Since the 2018 elections, a dark cloud of doubt and suspicion has engulfed our electoral democracy. A basic survey among citizens notes deep-seated problems of mistrust and suspicion by citizens over the inability of ZEC to preside over a free and fair election that meets international standards.

Enter March 2022 By-Elections!

The run-up to the elections was marred by a lot of inconsistencies on the part of ZEC. Electoral advocacy group Pachedu noted a lot of inconsistencies within the voters' roll that was to be used for the by-elections. In some instances, ZEC had either changed addresses or polling stations for some voters. On the day of the by-election, many voters failed to vote because their names were not on the voters' roll. This is besides that in the 2018 general elections, they managed to vote. Added to this, the by-elections were also marred by widespread violations of the Electoral Act mostly by the ruling party, ZANU PF. In Chivi South, for example, ZANU PF campaign vehicles were roving around polling stations soliciting votes on the day of the election. This violates Sections 160A (G, K) and 160A (7)(1e) of the Electoral Act.

Attempts by the newly formed Citizen Coalition for Change (CCC) Secretary-General, Charlton Hwende to get a voters roll earlier before the day of the by-election hit a snag as he was violently stopped by armed riot police from accessing ZEC offices in Harare. Against all the numerous anomalies raised by Pachedu, ZEC did very little to restore public confidence but proceeded with the by-election. True to what Pachedu noted around irregularities and inconsistencies with the voters roll, many people across constituencies were turned away and failed to exercise their right to vote.

The recent by-election has put the final death nail on our electoral democracy and on the ability of ZEC to preside over free and fair elections. In Epworth constituency where I was an observer, many people who were turned away had proof that they were registered and voted in the 2018 general elections. Some even went a step further by utilizing the mobile ZEC platform for registration to check if they were registered.

2023 Elections

Disbanding ZEC is tantamount to rewriting the constitution. Given that we are just a few months to go before the next election, it will be premature to call for the disbandment of ZEC. One of the key reforms that opposition parties have been pushing for over the years is the Diaspora vote. While ZANU PF and ZEC have been unrelenting on this, the opposition must restrategize. In my view; they need to redefine the “Diaspora” target citizens in neighbouring countries such as South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia. Citizens in these countries stand a better chance of voting in next years’ election. It is estimated that over 2 million Zimbabweans reside in South Africa. For the opposition, it then becomes imperative to think around modalities on how these people can be registered to vote in the 2023 general elections. Although this has its own challenges the fact that some political parties have branches or structures in some of these countries makes it even easier.

In the final analysis, ZEC has failed to inspire confidence even in a new set of voters on the horizon. The way it administered the March by-elections and the inconsistencies in the voters' roll have eroded citizens’ confidence. The 2023 elections will be nothing different.

Homeland or Death, Tinofa Tichienda!

Rawlings Magede is a Development Practitioner, who writes here in his personal capacity. He tweets @rawmagede and is contactable on vamagede@gmail.com